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Proof and Problem Solving at University Level
Annie Selden and John Selden
New Mexico State University, USA
Abstract: This paper will be concerned with undergraduate and graduate students’
problem solving as they encounter it in attempting to prove theorems, mainly to satisfy
their professors in their courses, but also as they conduct original research for theses and
dissertations. We take Schoenfeld’s (1985) view of problem, namely, a mathematical task
is a problem for an individual if that person does not already know a method of solution
for that task. Thus, a given task may be a problem for one individual, who does not
already know a solution method for that task, or it may be an exercise for an individual
who already knows a procedure or an algorithm for solving that task.
Keywords: Hungary, mathematics education, mathematics competition, Olympiads,
international comparative mathematics education, problem solving, creativity,
mathematically talented students.

A Continuum of Tasks from Very Routine to Very Non-routine
While what is a problem depends on what a solver knows, it is possible for most
mathematics teachers to judge what is difficult for most students in a given class. Thus,
we see mathematical tasks for a given class, such as a calculus class, on a continuum
from those that are very routine to those that are genuinely difficult problems (Selden,
Selden, Hauk, & Mason, 2000). At one end, there are very routine problems which mimic
sample worked problems found in textbooks or lectures, except for minor changes in
wording, notation, coefficients, constants, or functions that are incidental to the way the
problems are solved. Such problems are often referred to as exercises (and might not be
considered to be problems at all in the problem-solving literature).

The Mathematics Enthusiast, ISSN 1551-3440, Vol. 10, nos.1&2, pp.303-334

2013©The Author(s) &Dept. of Mathematical Sciences-The University of Montana

Selden &Selden
The vast majority of exercises in calculus textbooks are of this nature. Lithner
(2004) distinguished three possible solution strategies for typical calculus textbook
exercises: identification of similarities (IS), local plausible reasoning (LPR), and global
plausible reasoning (GPR). In IS, one identifies surface features of the exercise and looks
for a similar textbook situation -- an example, a rule, a definition, a theorem. Without
consideration of intrinsic mathematical properties, one simply copies the procedure of
that situation. In LPR, one identifies a slightly similar textbook situation, but one in
which a few local parts may differ. The solution strategy is to copy as much as possible
from that similar situation, modifying local steps as needed. In GPR, the strategy is
mainly based on analyzing and considering intrinsic mathematical properties of the
exercise, and using these, a solution is constructed and supported by plausible reasoning.
Lithner selected a textbook used in Sweden [Adams' Calculus: A Complete Course (5th
ed.), Addison-Wesley], and worked through and classified solution strategies for 598
single-variable calculus exercises. He found 85% IS, 8% LPR, and 7% GPR.
Furthermore, he concluded that "it is possible in about 70% of the exercises to base the
solution not only on searching for similar situations, but on searching only the solved
examples."
Moving toward the middle of the continuum, there are moderately routine
problems which, although not exactly like sample worked problems, can be solved by
well-practiced methods, for example, ordinary related rates or change of variable
integration problems in a calculus course.1 Moving further along the continuum, there are
moderately non-routine problems, which are not very similar to problems that students
1

Sandra Marshall (1995) has studied how students can develop schema (well-practiced
routines) to reliably guide the solution of arithmetic word problems.
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have seen before and require known facts or skills to be combined in a slightly novel
way, but are "straightforward" in not requiring, for example, the consideration of multiple
sub-problems or novel insights. This is the type of problem we used on the non-routine
test in our three studies of undergraduate students’ calculus problem solving. One of
those problems was: Find values of a and b so that the line 2x+3y=a is tangent to the
graph of f ( x )  bx 2 at the point where x=3. (Selden, Selden, Mason, & Hauk, 2000, p.
133).
Finally, at the opposite end of the continuum from routine problems, there are
very non-routine problems which, while dependent on resources in one’s knowledge
base, may involve considerable insight, the consideration of several sub-problems or
constructions, and use of Schoenfeld's (1985) behavioral problem-solving characteristics
(heuristics, control, beliefs). For such problems a large supply of tentative solution starts
(Selden, Selden, Mason, & Hauk, 2000, p. 145), built up from experience, might not be
adequate to bring to mind the resources needed for a solution, while for moderately novel
problems it probably would. Often the Putnam Examinations include such very nonroutine problems.2

2

The following problem was on the 59th Annual William Lowell Putnam Mathematical
Competition given on December 5, 1998: Given a point (a, b) with 0 < b < a, determine
the minimum perimeter of a triangle with one vertex at (a, b), one on the x-axis, and one
on the line y = x. You may assume that a triangle of minimum perimeter exists.
This appears to be a calculus problem, but it only requires clever use of geometry.
An elegant solution (posted by Iliya Bluskov to the sci.math newsgroup) involves
extending the construction "outward" by reflecting across both the lines y = x and the xaxis and noticing that the perimeter of the triangle equals the distance along the path from
(b, a) to (a, -b). Probably only very experienced geometry problem solvers could have
previously constructed images of problem situations containing a tentative solution start
that would easily bring this method to mind.
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Most U.S. university mathematics teachers would probably like undergraduate
students who pass their lower-level courses, such as calculus, to be able to work a wide
selection of routine, or even moderately routine, problems. In addition, we believe that
many such teachers would also expect their better students to be able to work moderately
non-routine problems, and would think of the ability to do so as functionally equivalent
to having a good conceptual grasp of the course. In other words, we conjecture that the
ability to work moderately non-routine problems based on the material in a university
mathematics course, such as calculus, is often considered part of the implicit curriculum
and taken as equivalent to good conceptual grasp. However, no research has yet been
done to substantiate this conjecture.

Tentative Solution Starts
An individual who has reflected on a number of problems is likely to have seen
(perhaps tacitly) similarities between some of them. He or she might recognize (not
necessarily explicitly or consciously) several overlapping problem situations, each arising
from problems with similar features. For example, after much exposure, many lowerlevel university students would probably recognize a problem as one involving, for
example, factoring, several linear equations, or integration by parts.3 Such problem
situations can act much like concepts (perhaps without signs or labels). While they may
lack names, for a given individual they are likely to be associated with mental images,
3

Although the kinds of features noticed by students in mathematical problem situations
do not seem to have been well studied, the features focused on in physics problem
situations have been observed to correspond to an individual’s degree of expertise.
Novices tend to favor surface characteristics (e.g., pulleys), whereas experts tended to
focus on underlying principles of physics (e.g., conservation of energy) (Chi, Feltovich,
& Glaser, 1981).
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that is, strategies, examples, non-examples, theorems, judgments of difficulty, and the
like. Following Tall and Vinner's (1981) idea of concept image, we have called this kind
of mental structure a problem situation image and have suggested that some such images
may, and others may not, contain what we have called tentative solution starts (Selden,
Selden, Hauk, & Mason, 2000, p. 145). These are tentative general ideas for beginning
the process of finding a solution. The linking of problem situations with one or more
tentative solution starts is a kind of (perhaps tacit) knowledge. For instance, the image of
a problem situation asking for the solution to an equation might include "try getting a
zero on one side and then factoring the other." It might also include "try writing the
equation as f(x) = 0 and looking for where the graph of f(x) crosses the x-axis," or even
"perhaps the maximum of f is negative so f(x) = 0 has no solution." We suggest that an
individual’s problem-solving processes are likely to include the recognition of a problem
as belonging to one or more problem situations, and hence, bring to mind one or more
tentative solution starts contained in that individual's problem situation image. This, in
turn, may mentally prime the recall of resources from that individual's knowledge base.
Thus, a tentative solution start may link recognition of a problem situation with the recall
of appropriate resources. We have suggested that problem situations, their images, and
the associated tentative solution starts all vary from individual to individual and that the
process of mentally linking recognition (of a problem situation) to recall (of requisite
resources) through problem situation images might occur several times in solving a single
problem, especially when an impasse occurs (Selden, Selden, Mason, & Hauk, 2000, pp.
145-147).
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The Genre of Proof
We consider proofs, those that occur in advanced university mathematics
textbooks and research journals, as being written in a special genre. It is clear that not
every mathematical argument can be considered a proof, and much has been written in
the mathematics education research literature about the distinction between
argumentation and proof. (See, for example, Duval, as reported in Dreyfus, 1999, and
Douek, 1999.) In this paper, we are considering proofs of the sort that advanced
undergraduate students and beginning graduate mathematics students are expected to
produce for their professors. We are aware that many upper-level U.S. mathematics
majors just beginning their study of proof-based courses such as abstract algebra and real
analysis often have great difficulty producing such proofs, despite the fact that many of
them have previously taken a transition-to-proof course (Moore, 1994), usually in their
second year of university. Students in such transition-to-proof courses often have trouble
knowing what to write, especially when asked to prove simple set theory theorems,
perhaps because the results are “too obvious” or are verifiable using examples or Venn
diagrams. Thus, learning the genre of proof is important. Indeed, to help students learn
the genre of proof, we have considered two aspects (or parts) of a final written proof: the
formal-rhetorical part and the problem-centered part. The formal-rhetorical part of a
proof (also sometimes referred to as a proof framework) is the part of a proof that
depends only on unpacking and using the logical structure of the statement of the
theorem, associated definitions, and earlier results. In general, this part does not depend
on a deep understanding of, or intuition about, the concepts involved or on genuine
problem solving in the sense of Schoenfeld (1985, p. 74). We call the remaining part of a
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proof the problem-centered part. It is the part that does depend on genuine mathematical
problem solving, intuition, and a deeper understanding of the concepts involved. (See
Selden & Selden, 2009).
A sample proof framework is given below for a proof of the following theorem: If
f and g are real valued functions of a real variable continuous at a, then f + g is
continuous at a.
Proof. Let f and g be functions and suppose they are continuous at a. Suppose 
is a number > 0. Because f is continuous, there is a f >0 so that for all x, if | x – a| < f,
then | f(x) – f(a) | < ____. Also because g is continuous, there is a g >0 so that for all x, if
| x – a | <g, then
| g(x) – g(a) | < ____ . Let  = ____. Note that  > 0. Let x be a number.
Suppose that | x – a | <  . Then | f(x) + g(x) – ( f(a) + g(a) ) | = … <  . Thus, | f(x) +
g(x) – ( f(a) + g(a) ) | <  . Therefore f + g is continuous at a.
The problem-centered part of the proof consists of cleverly filling in the blanks
using, for example 

2

, minimum, and the triangle inequality. This is not to say that

filling in the blanks is easy. Indeed it can be very difficult for an individual with little or
no experience with such real analysis proofs.
Being able to write a proof framework can be very helpful for students because it
not only improves their proof writing, bringing it in line with accepted community norms,
but also because it can reveal the nature of the problem(s) to be solved. Having once
learned to write a number of proof frameworks, students can then concentrate their
creative energies on solving the actual mathematical problems involved. In addition, for
students, writing the formal-rhetorical part of a proof, and whatever else they can
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regarding the actual problem(s) to be solved, can enable their university mathematics
teachers to give more helpful and targeted criticism and advice.

The Close Relationship Between Problem Solving and Proving
A number of authors have remarked on the close relationship between problem
solving and proving (e.g., Furinghetti & Morselli, 2009; Mamona-Downs & Downs,
2009; Moore, 1994), and our division of proofs into their formal-rhetorical and problemcentered parts (described above) can make this explicit for students. However, having
good ideas for how to solve the problem-centered part of a proof is not equivalent to
having a proof. Mamona-Downs and Downs (2009) have given university students
informal arguments suggesting a way to solve tasks and asked them to convert those
arguments into acceptable mathematical form. They concluded that “proof production
[from an intuitively developed argument] can involve significant problem solving
aspects. … A particularly frustrating circumstance for a student is when he/she can ‘see’
a reason why a mathematical proposition is true, but lacks the means to express it as an
explicit [mathematical] argument. ” Thus, there are actually two distinct kinds of problem
solving that can occur during proof construction, namely, solving the actual mathematical
problem(s) that enable one to get from the given hypotheses to the given conclusion, and
converting one’s (informal) solution into acceptable mathematical form. Neither of these
problem-solving tasks is easy and students may require instruction and practice with
each. How informal arguments are converted into acceptable mathematical form has been
very little researched.
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Figure 1. A “picture” of g  f with the epsilon and delta neighborhoods indicated.
However, the theorem whose proof framework was illustrated above, namely, If f
and g are real valued functions of a real variable continuous at a, then f + g is
continuous at a, and whose proof involves using minimum and the triangle inequality
cannot be easily obtained from informal intuitive argumentation about adding together
the ordinates of the Cartesian graphs of f and g.

The Importance of Problem Reformulation and Selection of Appropriate
Representations
A number of researchers (e.g., Boero, 2001; Gholamazad, Liljedahl & Zazkis,
2003; Zazkis & Liljedahl, 2004) have noted that reformulating a problem by making an
appropriate choice of representation is often useful, sometimes even necessary, to make
progress. Furinghetti and Morselli (2009) reported the unsuccessful problem-solving
behavior of two fourth-year Italian university mathematics education students during
attempts to prove that The sum of two numbers that are prime to one another is prime to
each of the addends. One student, with the pseudonym Flower, after some initial panic
and working with examples, succeeded in producing a potentially helpful representation
(using the Prime Factorization Theorem), but could not exploit it. The other student, with
the pseudonym Booh, first chose the representation of Least Common Multiple that
“synthesizes [captures the essence of] the property, but doesn’t allow algebraic
manipulation … being non-transparent” and realized that it was “without future.” So he
considered another representation (also using the Prime Factorization Theorem), but also
could not exploit it. In a separate earlier paper, Furinghetti & Moriselli (2007) reported
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the unconventional, metaphorical thinking of another student who chose to think of, and
draw, a frog jumping from stop to stop (i.e., from integer to integer on the number line)
and successfully proved the same theorem. They noted that “The choice of the
representation … may foster or hinder transformational and anticipatory thinking, which
are two key issues in the proving process” (Furinghetti & Morselli, 2009, p. 74).
Concepts can have several (easily manipulated) symbolic representations or none
at all. For example, prime numbers have no such representation; they are sometimes
defined as those positive integers having exactly two factors or being divisible only by 1
and themselves. It has been argued that the lack of an (easily manipulated) symbolic
representation makes understanding prime numbers especially difficult, in particular, for
preservice teachers (Zazkis & Liljedahl, 2004).
Symbolic representations can make certain features transparent and others
opaque.4 For example, if one wants to prove a multiplicative property of complex
numbers, it is often better to use the representation rei , rather than x  iy , and if one
wants to prove certain results in linear algebra, it may be better to use linear
transformations, T, rather than matrices. Students often lack the experience to know when
a given representation is likely to be useful. More research is needed on the effect of
one’s choice of representation(s) on successful problem-solving behavior.

How Mathematicians Solve Problems

4

For example, representing 784 as 282 makes the property of being a perfect square
transparent and the property of being divisible by 98 opaque. For more details, see Zazkis
and Liljedahl (2004, pp. 165-166).
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It would be very informative to have research on how advanced university
mathematics students or mathematicians actually construct proofs in real time, but such a
study has not yet been conducted. However, there is research on how mathematicians
solve mathematical problems of various kinds: Carlson and Bloom (2005) investigated
how mathematicians manage their well-connected conceptual knowledge and make
decisions during problem solving; DeFranco (1996) replicated Schoenfeld’s work on the
use of resources, heuristics, control, and beliefs with mathematicians; and Stylianou
(2002) investigated how mathematicians use diagrams in problem solving.
However, the problems given to the mathematicians in these studies were not the
sort encountered by advanced undergraduate or graduate mathematics students when
constructing proofs for their courses or by professors when conducting research. For
example, one problem whose solution Carlson and Bloom (2005, p. 55) discussed at
length was: A square piece of paper ABDC is white on the front side and black on the

back side and has an area of 3 square inches. Corner A is folded over to point A’ which
lies on the diagonal AC such that the total visible area is ½ white and ½ black. How far
is A’ from the fold line? One problem used by DeFranco (p. 212) was: In how many ways
can you change one-half dollar?
Still some of the results are interesting, so we briefly recall them here. Based on
interviews with 12 mathematicians, Carlson and Bloom (2005) developed a “problem
solving framework” that has four phases (orientation, planning, executing, and checking).
As part of the planning phase, there was a conjecture-imagine-evaluate sub-cycle, in
which the mathematicians typically imagined a hypothetical solution approach, followed
by “playing out” and evaluating whether that approach was viable. If it was not viable,
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the conjecture-imagine-evaluate sub-cycle was repeated until a viable solution path was
identified. Carlson and Bloom (2005, p. 45) stated, “The effectiveness of the
mathematicians in making intelligent decisions that led down productive paths appeared
to stem from their ability to draw on a large reservoir of well-connected knowledge,
heuristics, and facts, as well as their ability to manage their emotional responses.”
DeFranco (1996) studied the problem-solving behaviors of eight research
mathematicians who had achieved national or international recognition in the
mathematics community (e.g., had altogether 12 honorary degrees and had been awarded
prizes such as the National Medal of Science) and eight who had not achieved such
recognition, but had published from three to 52 articles. He concluded that the former
were problem-solving experts, as well as content experts, and had superior metacognitve
skills, whereas the latter were content experts with only modest problem-solving skills.
Stylianou (2002) was interested in the interplay between visualization and
analytical thinking and asked mathematicians the following problem: Given a right

circular cylinder cut at an angle (shown in her accompanying diagram), describe the
resulting truncated cylinder’s net, that is, the “unrolled” truncated cylinder. She
observed that the “mathematicians consistently attempted to infer additional
consequences from their visual action. Each time a mathematician either constructed a
new diagram or modified a previously constructed one, he took a few seconds to ‘extract’
any additional information . . . and to understand any possible implications.”
In addition, there have been studies (e.g., Burton, 1999) that have included the
reflections of mathematicians upon their own ways of working; however, these are often
too general to be useful for an in-depth understanding of problem solving or for obtaining
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suggestions for teaching. For example, Burton (1999) found some of the mathematicians
likened problem solving and research to working on jigsaw puzzles or to climbing
mountains.

The Role of Affect in Proving and Problem Solving
While strong affect can play both a positive and a negative role during proving
and problem solving, more research is needed on the role of various kinds of affect from
beliefs and attitudes to emotions and feelings. Furinghetti and Morselli (2009, p. 82)
considered how negative affective factors influenced the problem-solving behavior of
their two unsuccessful students. They noted that Flower panicked immediately after
reading the statement of the theorem writing, “Help! I’m not familiar with prime
numbers!” Later, after constructing some examples, Flower wrote, “Help! I cannot do it, I
do not see anything. Deepest darkness.” Then when she came up with the prime
factorizations, Flower apparently expected to “conclude the proving process in an almost
automatic way … [without] the possibility of dead ends and failures,” illustrating that
beliefs and expectations are also important factors influencing problem-solving
outcomes.
In their study of mathematicians’ problem solving, Carlson and Bloom (2005)
concluded, “The effectiveness of the mathematicians … appeared to stem from their
ability to draw on a large reservoir of well-connected knowledge, heuristics, and facts, as
well as their ability to manage their emotional responses [italics ours].” In a study of
non-routine problem solving, McLeod, Metzger, and Craviotto (1989) found that both
experts (research mathematicians) and novices (undergraduates enrolled in college-level
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mathematics courses), when given different experience appropriate problems, reported
having similar intense emotional reactions such as frustration, aggravation, and
disappointment, but the experts were better able to control them.
DeBellis and Goldin (1997, 2006) have considered affect (i.e., values, beliefs,
attitudes, and emotions) as an internal representational system that is not merely auxiliary
to cognition, but as “a highly structured system that encodes information, interacting
fundamentally – and reciprocally – with cognition.” They have introduced the construct
of meta-affect, by which they mean not only affect about affect, but also cognition that
acts to monitor and direct one’s emotional feelings. They also suggested that one might
characterize individuals’ affective competencies, such as the ability to act on curiosity or
to see frustrations as a signal to modify strategy, but did not suggest how to do so.
In addition, we see nonemotional cognitive feelings of appropriateness and of
rightness or wrongness as giving direction to one’s problem-solving efforts. As Mangan
(2001, Section 6, Paragraph 3) said, “In trying to solve, say, a demanding math problem,
[a feeling of] rightness/wrongness gives us a sense of more or less promising directions
long before we have the actual solution in hand.” Below we give the example of Mary, a
returning graduate student, who did not get a feeling of appropriateness with regard to
using fixed, but arbitrary elements in her real analysis proofs for at least half a semester.
Also there have been working groups on affect and mathematical thinking at
several recent CERME conferences,5 but the discussions there seem to have been mainly
concerned with methodological issues and such topics as changing teachers’ and
students’ motivation and attitudes towards mathematics. Still we feel that the interplay
5

CERME is the Congress of the European Society for Research in Mathematics
Education, many of whose Proceedings are available online.
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between cognition and affect during problem solving and proving needs further
investigation.

How University Mathematics Students Prove Theorems
Much of the research on university students’ proving has been concerned with
difficulties they encounter or competencies needed. These include the use of logic,
especially quantifiers (Dubinsky & Yiparaki, 2000; Epp, 2009; Selden & Selden, 1995);
the necessity to employ formal definitions (Edwards & Ward, 2004); the need for a
repertoire of examples, counterexample, and nonexamples (Dahlberg & Housman, 1997);
the requirement for a deep understanding of the concepts and theorems involved (Weber,
2001); the need for strategic knowledge of which theorems are important (Weber, 2001),
the selection of appropriate representations (Kaput, 1991); and the importance of being to
be able to validate (i.e., read and check) one’s own and others’ proofs for correctness
(Selden & Selden, 2003).

Teaching Proving to University Mathematics Students
For several years, we have been developing methods for teaching proof
construction to advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate mathematics students.
We have developed an inquiry-based Modified Moore Method course (Mahavier, 1999;
Coppin, Mahavier, May, & Parker, 2009) for advanced undergraduate and beginning
graduate mathematics students who need help with proving (hereafter referred to as the
“proofs course” and described in Selden, McKee, & Selden, 2010) and a voluntary
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proving supplement for undergraduate real analysis (hereafter referred to as the
“supplement” and described in McKee, Savic, Selden, & Selden, 2010).
In the proofs course, the students are given self-contained notes consisting of
statements of theorems, definitions, and requests for examples, but no proofs. The
students construct their proofs at home and present them in class. The proofs are then
critiqued, sometimes extensively, and additionally suggestions for improvements in the
notation used and the style of writing are given. There are no formal lectures, and all
comments and conversations are based solely on students’ work. The specific topics
covered are of less importance than giving students opportunities to experience as many
different kinds of proofs as possible so we select theorems from sets, functions, real
analysis, semigroups, and topology.
We have developed some theoretical underpinnings for the two courses. One such
theoretical underpinning involves having students develop a proof framework first in
order to reveal the mathematical problem(s) to be solved. (See the above description in
“The Genre of Proof” section.) While students with little experience in proof writing, at
first can find constructing a proof framework to be a problem of moderate difficulty,
eventually through practice, writing a proof framework can become routine or very
routine.
In addition, our proofs course notes are constructed to give students opportunities
to prove theorems that are successively more non-routine. But non-routineness is not
unidimensional; it is not simply a matter of whether the students have seen the concepts
before or have the necessary factual knowledge but cannot bring it to mind (as was the
case for the students in our calculus studies). In our proofs course notes we have “built
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in” non-routine theorems, which we refer to as theorems of Types 1, 2, and 3. Type 1

theorems have proofs that can depend on a previous result in the notes. These theorems
are included to encourage students to look for helpful previous results, as we have found
that students often attempt to prove theorems directly from the definitions without
recourse to previous results. Type 2 theorems require formulating and proving a lemma
not in the notes, but one that is relatively easy to notice, formulate, and prove, whereas

Type 3 theorems require formulating and proving a lemma not in the notes, but one that is
hard to notice, formulate, and prove. An example of a Type 3 theorem is: A communtative

semigroup S with no proper ideals is a group, given after a brief introduction to the ideas
of semigroup and ideals thereof. What is needed for a proof of this theorem is the
observation that aS is an ideal and hence aS=S. (This is the first lemma needed.) This is
followed by the nontrivial observation that aS=S implies that equations of the form ax=b
are solvable for any b in S. Using some clever instantiations of this equation, one can
obtain an identity and inverses, and hence, conclude S is a group. To date only two
students have been able to produce a proof without help or hints, and several mathematics
faculty (whose speciality is not semigroups) have found that proving this theorem takes
time and a certain amount of reformulation. This convinces us that this theorem can be
considered at least moderately non-routine. More research is needed on what makes a
problem non-routine (for an individual or a class), that is, what are the various
dimensions or characteristics contributing to non-routineness.

The Co-construction of Proofs in the Supplement
We have implemented this method three times to date in small (at most 10
students) supplementary voluntary proving classes for real analysis. The supplement is
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intended for students who feel unsure of how to proceed in constructing real analysis
proofs. At the beginning of a supplement class period, the statement of a theorem entirely
new to them, but similar to a theorem assigned for homework, but not a template
theorem, is written on the board. The students themselves, or one of us if need be, offer
suggestions about what to do, beginning with the construction of a proof framework. For
each suggested action, such as writing up the hypotheses or an appropriate definition,
drawing a sketch, or introducing cases, one student is asked to carry out the action at the
blackboard. The intention is that all students reflect on the actions and later perform
similar actions autonomously on their assigned homework (McKee, Savic, Selden, &
Selden, 2010).
For example, if the students are to prove a sequence {an }n1 converges to A , they
would typically begin by writing the hypotheses, leave a space, and write the conclusion.
After unpacking the conclusion, they would write “Let   0 ” immediately after the
hypotheses, leave a space for the determination of N , write “Let n  N ”, leave another
space, and finally write “Then | an  A |  ” prior to the conclusion at the bottom of their
nascent proof. This would conclude the construction of a proof framework and bring
them to the problem-centered part of the proof (Selden & Selden, 2009), where some
“exploration” or “brainstorming” on the side board would ensue. The entire coconstruction process, and accompanying discussions, is a slow one – so slow that only
one theorem can be proved and discussed in detail in a 75-minute class period. More
research is needed on how to foster such mathematical “exploration” and
“brainstorming.”
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Theoretical Underpinnings: Actions and Behavioral Schemas
Actions in the Proving Process
We see proving as an activity, that is, as a sequence of actions, that are either
physical (such as writing or drawing) or mental (such as attempting to recall a definition
or theorem). Each action is paired with, and is a response to, a situation in a partly
completed proof. By a situation we mean a reasoner’s inner, or interpreted, situation as
opposed to an outer situation that may be visible to an observer. Although we are
referring to a person’s inner situation, we have found in teaching that we can often gauge
approximately what the inner situation is from the outer, observable, situation and the
ensuing action. For example, below we will interpret Sofia’s staring blankly at the
blackboard during tutoring sessions as the situation of not knowing what to do next.
If a person engages in proving several theorems, then he or she is likely to
experience a number of similar situations yielding similar actions. The first such
situation-action pair is likely to have a conscious warrant based on, say, heuristics, logic,
strategy, or known mathematics. However with time and (sometimes considerable)
repetition, the need for a conscious warrant may disappear. The situation may then
become linked, in an automated way, to a tendency to carry out the corresponding action;
and the individual will not be conscious of anything happening between the situation and
the action. We see such automated situation-action pairs as persistent mental structures
and have called the smallest of them behavioral schemas (Selden, McKee, & Selden,
2010; Selden & Selden, 2011). By a small situation-action pair, we mean one that is not
equivalent to any sequence of smaller such pairs. While the word “schema” has been
used in several ways in the literature, we only mean such a persistent mental structure.
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Behavioral schemas
The formation of behavioral schemas, whether beneficial or detrimental, requires
the development of a way of recognizing particular kinds of situations, and in response,
enacting particular kinds of actions. It is possible that neither the kind of situation nor the
kind of action for a potential behavioral schema exists as a concept in the surrounding
culture. In that case, constructing a behavioral schema entails noticing, either explicitly or
implicitly, similarities among situations and among the corresponding actions, and
eventually reifying these into what amounts to conceptions (usually without any need for
formal designations).

Properties of Behavioral Schemas
(1) Within very broad contextual considerations, behavioral schemas are
immediately available. They do not normally have to be recalled, that is, searched
for and brought to mind.
(2) Behavioral schemas operate outside of consciousness. A person is not aware
of doing anything immediately prior to the resulting action – he/she just does it.
Furthermore, the enactment of a behavioral schema that leads to an error is not
under conscious control, and one should not expect that merely understanding the
origin of the error would prevent its future occurrences.
(3) Behavioral schemas tend to produce immediate action, which may lead to
subsequent action. One becomes conscious of the action resulting from a
behavioral schema as it occurs or immediately after it occurs.
(4) A behavioral schema that would produce a particular action cannot pass that
information, outside of consciousness, to be acted on by another behavioral
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schema. The first action must actually take place and become conscious in order
to become information acted on by the second behavioral schema. That is, one
cannot “chain together” behavioral schemas in a way that functions entirely
outside of consciousness and produces consciousness of only the final action. For
example, if the solution to a linear equation would normally require several steps,
one cannot give the final answer without being conscious of some of the
intermediate steps.
(5) An action due to a behavioral schema depends on conscious input, at least in
large part. In general, a stimulus need not become conscious to influence a
person’s actions, but such influence is normally not precise enough for doing
mathematics. Also, non-conscious stimuli that lead to action usually originate
outside of the mind, not within it (as often happens in proof construction).
(6) Behavioral schemas are acquired (learned) through (possibly tacit) practice.
That is, to acquire a beneficial schema a person should actually carry out the
appropriate action correctly a number of times – not just understand its
appropriateness. Changing detrimental behavioral schemas, many of which have
been tacitly acquired, requires similar, perhaps longer, practice (Selden, McKee,
& Selden, 2010; Selden & Selden, 2011).
Implicitly acquired detrimental behavioral schemas can be enacted automatically
in problem-solving situations. For example, some experienced teachers may have noticed
that giving a counterexample to a student who consistently makes an errorful calculation,
such as (3a  b) / 3c  (a  b) / c or

a 2  b 2  a  b , is often not very effective. This can

be so even when the student seems to understand the counterexample. Our view of
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behavioral schemas suggests an explanation. If an incorrect algebraic simplification is
caused by the enactment of a behavioral schema, then the resulting action (the incorrect
simplification) would follow directly from the situation, that is, would not be under
conscious control. To change the student’s behavior, one might try to change the
detrimental behavioral schema not only by providing a counterexample, but also by
suggesting a number of relevant problems and some monitoring.

Using our Theoretical Underpinnings to Teach Proving
Having students write a proof framework first, enables them to “get started” on
writing a proof and reveals the mathematical problem(s) to be solved. What happens next
depends on a student’s ability to solve various mathematical problems. Informally, one of
our graduate students has reported that writing a proof framework helped her organize
her thoughts on her high stakes mathematics PhD comprehensive examinations. Also,
looking for students’ detrimental behavioral schemas and trying to help them replace
them with beneficial schemas has enabled us to help students with proof construction.
Sometimes acquiring a beneficial schema can take a long time.
Mary’s Reaction to Considering Fixed, but Arbitrary Elements
There are theorems, particularly in real analysis, that involve several quantifiers.
For example, proving a function f is continuous at a involves proving that for all
there is a

 0

so that for all x, if |x-a|<



 0

then |f(x)-f(a)|<  . For such proofs, one

needs to consider a fixed, but arbitrary  . Students are often reluctant to do this. We
conjecture this is because they do not feel it right or appropriate to do so.
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Mary, an advanced mathematics graduate student, was interviewed about events
that took place two years earlier when she was taking both a pilot version of our proofs
course and Dr. K’s graduate real analysis course. In the homework for Dr. K’s course,
Mary needed to prove many statements that included phrases like ‘For all real numbers

  0 ,’ where 

represented a variable (the situation). In her proofs, Mary needed to

write something like ‘Let 

 0 ,’ where  represented an arbitrary, but fixed number (the

action).
When Mary was interviewed about this situation-action pair she said the
following:
Mary:

At that point [early in Dr. K’s real analysis course] my biggest idea
was, well he said to “do it”, so I’m going to do it because I want to get
full credit. And so I didn’t have a sense of why it worked.

Interviewer:

Did you have any feeling … if it was positive or negative, or extra …

Mary:

Well, I guess I had a feeling of discomfort …

Interviewer:

Did this particular feature [having to fix  ] keep coming up in proofs?

Mary:

… it comes up a lot and what happened, and I don’t remember
[exactly] when, is that instead of being rote and kind of
uncomfortable, it started to just make sense … By the end of the
semester this was very comfortable for me.

Mary told us that, after completing each such proof, she attempted to convince
herself that considering a fixed, but arbitrary element resulted in a correct proof.
However, only after repeatedly executing this situation-action pair, and convincing
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herself that her individual proofs were correct, did she develop a feeling of
appropriateness.
Willy’s Focusing Too Soon on the Hypotheses
We have observed that after writing little more than the hypotheses, some
students turn immediately to focusing on using the hypotheses, rather than unpacking the
conclusion to see what is to be proved, after which they often cannot complete a proof.
For example, late in our proofs course, Willy was asked to prove the theorem: Let X and
Y be topological spaces and f : X  Y be a homeomorphism of X onto Y . If X is a

Hausdorff space, then so is Y . Because only ten minutes of class time remained and
Willy had indicated that he had not yet proved the theorem, we asked him to “do the setup”, that is, construct a proof framework (Selden, McKee, & Selden, 2010; Selden &
Selden, 2011).
On the left side of the blackboard, Willy wrote:

Proof. Let X and Y be topological spaces.
Let f : X  Y be a homeomorphism of X onto Y .
Suppose X is a Hausdorff space.
...
Then Y is a Hausdorff space.
Then, on the right side of the board which was for scratch work, he listed one
after the other: “homeomorphism, one-to-one, onto, continuous (f is open mapping)”. He
then looked perplexedly back at the left side of the board. Even after two hints to look at
the final line of his proof, Willy said, “And, I was just trying to just think,
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homeomorphism means one-to-one, onto, …” After some discussion about the meaning
of homeomorphism, the first author said, “There is no harm in analysing what stuff you
might want to use, but there is more to do before you can use any of that stuff”, meaning
that the conclusion should be examined and unpacked first.
We inferred that Willy was enacting a behavioral schema in which the situation
was having written little more than the hypotheses, and the action was focusing on the
meaning and potential uses of those hypotheses before examining the conclusion. We
conjectured that Willy and other students, who are reluctant to look at, and unpack, the
conclusion feel uncomfortable about this, or perhaps feel it more appropriate to begin
with the hypotheses and work forward.
Sofia’s Reaction to Not Having an Idea
Sofia was a diligent first-year graduate student; however, as our proofs course
progressed, an unfortunate pattern in her proving attempts emerged. When she did not
have an idea for how to proceed, she often produced what one might call an “unreflective
guess” only loosely related to the context at hand, after which she could not make further
progress. Although we could sometimes speculate on the origins of Sofia’s guesses, we
could not see how they could reasonably have been helpful in making a proof, nor did she
seem to reflect on, or evaluate, them herself. We inferred that Sofia was enacting a
behavioral schema: she was recognizing a situation, that is, that she had written as much
of a proof as she could, and had a feeling of not knowing what to do next. This situation
was linked in an automated way to the action of just guessing any approach that usually
was only loosely related to the problem at hand without much reflection on its usefulness.
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Using our idea of behavioral schemas, we devised an intervention that was used in
tutoring sessions with Sofia. We attempted to deflect implementation of her “unreflective
guess” schema, by suggesting that she write the first and last lines of a proof, unpack the
conclusion, and then do something else, such as draw a diagram, review her class notes,
or reflect on everything done so far. These suggestions and guidance helped Sofia
construct a beneficial behavioral schema. As the course ended, this intervention of
directing Sofia to do something else was beginning to show promise. For example, on the
in-class final examination Sofia proved that if f, g, and h are functions from a set to
itself, f is one-to-one, and f  g  f  h , then g  h . Also on the take-home final,
except for a small omission, she proved that the set of points on which two continuous
functions between Hausdorff spaces agree is closed. This shows Sofia was able to
complete the problem-centered parts of at least a few proofs by the end of the course, and
suggests her “unreflective guess” behavioral schema was weakened (Selden, McKee, &
Selden, 2010; Selden & Selden, 2011).

Future Research on Proof and Problem Solving
The above discussion has not only synthesized some of the literature on proof and
problem solving, it has highlighted several areas that could use more research. These are:
how informal arguments are converted into acceptable mathematical form; how
representation choice influences an individual’s problem-solving and proving behaviour
and success; how students’ and mathematicians’ prove theorems in real time (especially
when working alone); how various kinds of affect, including beliefs, attitudes, emotions,
and feelings, are interwoven with cognition during problem solving; which characteristics
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make a problem non-routine (for an individual or a class), that is, what are the various
dimensions contributing to non-routineness; and how one might foster mathematical
“exploration” and “brainstorming” as an aid to problem solving.
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